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necessitating further clarification by the Court. A possible solution to the
problem of trade secret protection and its relationship to the policies of
federal patent law is the enactment of uniform legislation which would
answer the need for a nationwide system of protection, and, at the same
10 2
time, avoid some of the vagaries of present state laws.
Joseph A. Eagan, Jr.

FEDERAL COURTS
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT -

MAY GRANT DECLARATORY RELIEF FROM
EDLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL

As APPLIED IF

A

FEDERAL COURT

A STATE STATUTE ALLEGSTATE

PROSECUTION

IS

THREATENED, BUT NOT PENDING.

Steffel v. Thompson (U.S. 1974)
Threatened twice with arrest for violation of a Georgia criminal trespass statute,' petitioner sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, asserting
that the statute as applied to him violated his fourteenth amendment due
process right to freedom of speech.2 On October 8, 1970, petitioner and
others were engaged in the distribution of handbills, which criticized
American involvement in Vietnam, upon the exterior sidewalk of a large
shopping center. When the protesters failed to leave at the request of the
center's manager,2 police were summoned. Warned that they would be
arrested if they continued to handbill, the group departed. However, petitioner and a friend returned 2 days later, and police again threatened them
with arrest. Fearful of this prospect, petitioner left, while his companion,
4
who remained, was arrested and charged with violation of the statute.
102. This nationwide system of protection would have as its advantage the avoidance of confusion and conflict among the various state laws. See Klein, The Technical
Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L. Rv. 437 (1960) ; Stedman, Trade
Secrets, 23 0. ST. L.J. 4 (1962); Note, The Trade Secret Quagmire - Proposed
Federal Solution, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1966); Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets:
The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L. Rv. 378 (1971).
1. GA. CoDE ANN. § 26-1503 (1968).
2. Becker v. Thompson, 334 F. Supp. 1386, 1387-88 (N.D. Ga. 1971). The
petitioner claimed state deprivation of his federal rights under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), invoking the jurisdiction of the district court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). His prayer for declaratory relief was premised

upon the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, id. §§ 2201-2202, while his request for
an injunction was based upon the federal three-judge court statute, id. § 2281.
3. The center had maintained regulations against distributing handbills since

1965. Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, 920 (5th Cir. 1972).
4. Steffel
v. Thompson,
415 U.S.
452,of 456
(1974). Repository, 1974
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The district court dismissed the claims of petitioner and others because
it could find no active - and hence, no justiciable - controversy between
the parties.5 Abandoning the action for injunctive relief, petitioner appealed
the district court's denial of declaratory relief to the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed, holding that to obtain declaratory relief
from the threat of state prosecution petitioner was required to demonstrate
irreparable injury resulting from bad faith harassment by the state." The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding: 1) that since
petitioner faced a genuine threat of enforcement of a state criminal statute,
the case presented an actual "controversy" as required by Article III of
the Constitution; 2) that since no state prosecution was pending, declaratory
relief was not precluded regardless of the propriety of injunctive relief;
and 3) that it was irrelevant to the grant of declaratory relief whether the
statute was attacked as being invalid upon its face or as applied. Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
Under federal law, federal courts with proper jurisdiction have been
provided two means by which to intervene in state matters: declaratory
judgments 7 and injunctive relief.8 The degree to which the Supreme Court
has been willing to allow federal intervention by these means has been
influenced by the doctrines of abstention which require federal courts to
decline to hear cases raising questions of both state and federal constitutional
law, thereby allowing the claims to be heard in state courts. 9 Described
by one commentator as "creaturels] of twentieth century jurisprudence,"' 0
5. The district
that the state had or
6. 459 F.2d at
the tests articulated
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66

court denied relief because it found no meaningful allegation
would act in "bad faith." 334 F. Supp. at 1389-90.
923. The court based its decision upon- what it believed were
in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Samuels v.
(1971). 459 F.2d at 922-23. See notes 30-37 and accompanying

text infra.
7. The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (the Act) provides in part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the
United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought ...
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). The Act further provides that "[f]urther necessary or
proper relief based on a declaratory judgment may be granted. . . ." Id. § 2202. See
note 92 infra. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 100 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
8. The primary federal injunction statute providing for the enjoinment of state
statutes is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), which requires that such a question
be heard by a three-judge district court. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 7, §§ 48-51.
An injunction, unlike a declaratory judgment, threatens state officials who fail to
obey the federal court with the sanction of contempt. See Note, Federal Relief Against
Threatened State Prosecutions: The Implications of Younger, Lake Carriers, and Roe,
48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 965, 972 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Federal Relief]; Note, I used
to Love You But It's All Over Now: Abstention And The Federal Courts' Retreat
Front Their Role As Primary Guardians of First Amendment Freedoms, 45
S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 849 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Federal Courts' Retreat].
9. See generally WRIGHT, supranote 7, § 52.
10. Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/10
Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEX. L. REV. 535, 537 (1970).
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the philosophical underpinnings of the doctrines have been what the Steffel
court termed "the relevant principles of equity, comity, and federalism."' ,
From its inception,' 2 abstention has undergone three stages of doctrinal
development. Its first, occurring in the 1940's, was represented by two
major judicial theories: the Pullman doctrine' 3 and the Burford doctrine.14
While the former provided for greater compromise between federal and
state courts, in that federal courts were allowed to retain jurisdiction
whereas in the latter they had to dismiss the action, both doctrines stressed
the principle that state courts should be allowed to resolve essentially state
matters. In accord with this general proposition, the Supreme Court expressed its reluctance to intervene in state criminal proceedings in a series
of cases during this period.' 5 It contended that where special circumstances
might compel federal intervention in the form of injunctive relief, a showing
had to be made by the complainant that he faced an immediate threat of
numerous prosecutions such that he would sustain "exceptional and irreparable injury . . . if those threats were carried out . .

.

11. 415 U.S. at 462. The principles of federalism underscore the dictate of
comity that once a court has acquired jurisdiction of a cause, another court should
not interpose its processes. The issue of states' rights may make a federal court
even more hesitant to interfere because of the equitable policy of nonintervention in
matters of criminal law. See Note, Federal Injunctions Against State Criminal
Proceedings,4 STAN. L. REV. 381, 383, 387 (1952).
12. Although abstention was formally articulated in the 1940's, the principle
had already existed that equity and comity barred federal courts' intervention in
state criminal prosecutions. See Note, supra note 11, at 381-84.
13. The so-called Pullman doctrine, considered the first articulation of the
abstention doctrine, was set forth in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941), where the Supreme Court held that federal courts should refrain from
exercising jurisdiction if the state law in question was unclear and the decision of a
federal question could be avoided. Id. at 499-500. See Boyer, Federal Injunctive
Relief: A Counterpoise Against the Use of State Criminal Prosecutions Designed
to Deter the Exercise of Preferred Constitutional Rights, 13 How. L.J. 51, 76
(1967). The doctrine dictated that while federal courts should abstain from hearing
the case, they could retain jurisdiction. Thus, if, after review by the state court, a
federal question were found still to exist, the plaintiff could return to federal court.
See The Federal Courts' Retreat, supra note 8, at 849-51. See generally WRIGHT,
supra note 7, at 196-99.
In general, these doctrines remain viable. Federal courts often abstain to
avoid a premature constitutional decision if the state court can render a narrow
construction. E.g., Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (dicta). Or to avoid
making tentative decisions of issues of state law. E.g., Reetz v. Bozanick, 397 U.S. 82
(1970).
14. This doctrine was stated in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)
and was more absolute than that in Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941), since
the federal court was to dismiss both federal and state claims. See note 13 supra.
If a federal right was found prejudiced, the party would have to seek review of
the state decision in the Supreme Court of the United States. This procedure was held
appropriate when the state interest was particularly strong. See The Federal Courts'
Retreat, supra note 8, at 851-52. See also WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 52, at 199-200.
15. Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941) (absence of showing of specific
threat to plaintiff) ; Beal v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941) (mere threat
of single prosecution) ; Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95-96
(1935) (danger of irreparable loss must be great and immediate).
16. Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
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In the landmark decision of this period, Douglas v. City of Jeanette,"
the Court denied plaintiffs, Jehovah's Witnesses, the injunction they sought
to restrain threatened prosecution under a state statute which allegedly
abridged their first amendment rights.18 The Court stressed the exceptional
nature of federal intervention and stated that a person is not immune ffom
good faith prosecution of his alleged criminal acts. 19 State courts were
deemed the arbiters of state law; hence, the Court held that an injunction
should not be granted if the federal rights allegedly violated could be
20
vindicated in the defense of a single state court proceeding.
Responsive to national concern with civil rights, the Court indicated
21
a second stage of development with its decision in Dombrowski v. Pfister.
There, it enjoined a threatened criminal prosecution for violation of an
unconstitutionally vague statute whose language produced a "chilling
effect" upon the freedom of expression of civil rights workers.2 2 The Court
found that the usual single state proceeding would be inadequate where the
statute was facially unconstitutional in such a way that no single defense
could remove the defect

23

and where bad faith application of the statute

discouraged protected first amendment activity.2 4 Thus, under the aegis
of the Court's reasoning, an individual could establish irreparable injury by
17. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
18. Id. at 159. Plaintiffs were arrested and prosecuted for distributing religious
literature without a permit in violation of a city ordinance. Id. at 160.
19. Id. at 163.
20. Id. at 157. The Court further pointed out that the injury incident to good
faith prosecution was not sufficient to interrupt state court proceedings. Id. at 164-65.

21. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. Id. at 486-87. Plaintiffs had been arrested and indicted for violation of a
statute which forbade involvement with a subversive organization. Id. at 493. Although
a state court determined that the arrests had been illegal, state officials continued to
threaten prosecution unless the members of the organization registered under
Louisiana statutes. Id. at 487-88. Subsequently, plaintiffs, who were associated with
a civil rights group, sought both a declaratory judgment that the state laws were
unconstitutional and an injunction restraining state officers from prosecuting under
those laws. Id. at 481-82.
As one commentator has observed, the federal courts had acknowledged, even
prior to Dombrowski, the need in civil rights cases for injunctive relief against
threatened state prosecutions. Maraist, supra note 10, at 548-52. See, e.g., Browder
v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiain, 352 U.S. 903 (1956)
(district court declared state bus segregation statutes unconstitutional). See also
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ; McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668
(1963) ; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (exceptions created to the abstention
doctrine permitting intervention in the area of civil rights and free speech).
23. 380 U.S. at 489-91. Plaintiffs had alleged that state officials threatened prosecution under statutory provisions other than those under which indictments had been
brought. Thus, the entire statute would have to have been attacked in a piecemeal
fashion with no near prospect of a state adjudication. Id. at 489.
24. Id. at 489-90. In this case, plaintiffs had asserted additionally that state
officials threatened prosecution without any hope of success to inhibit plaintiffs' civil
rights activities. Id. at 490.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/10
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asserting that the threatened prosecution produced a chilling effect upon

25
the exercise of his first amendment rights.
With Dombrowski, the Court shifted from a position of overriding
deference to state courts and allowed federal courts "to assure the full
protection of federal constitutional rights. '26 While the Court may have
intended to require both facial unconstitutionality and bad faith, lower
courts found the language unclear.27 Consequently, the ambiguity of the
Dombrowski test and its liberal posture towards federal intervention produced a considerable upsurge in requests for declaratory and injunctive
relief at the lower federal court level. 2 8 Further clarification was needed
as to whether facial unconstitutionality alone was an adequate basis for
intervention or whether bad faith enforcement was a further prerequisite. 29
30
In response, the Court entered the third stage with Younger v. Harris
and its five accompanying cases, "the February Sextet, '31 which sharply
restricted the reach of Dombrowski in holding that the facial unconstitutionality of a statute alone would not justify injunctive relief.3 2 Assuming a
more conservative stance upon abstention, the Court asserted that in the
interests of federalism and comity, federal courts should refuse to intervene

25. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that to establish irreparable
injury the individual had to be actually threatened; a mere assertion of possible
prosecution was insufficient. Id. at 485, 490. It has been suggested that Dombrowski
enlarged the scope of irreparable injury. See Comment, Federal Injunctive Relief:
What Remains After Younger v. Harris?, 60 Ky. L.J. 216, 222 (1971). But see
Maraist, supra note 10, at 566.
26. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 119 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
27. See Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger and Beyond, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1324, 1327 (1972). The posture of
the Court 6 years later, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), supports a
narrow reading of the treatment of abstention in Dombrowski. See note 31 and
accompanying text infra. See also Maraist, supra note 10, at 567.
28. See Maraist, supra note 27, at 1327.
29. In a subsequent case, Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), which
appeared to narrow the scope of bad faith, the Court hinted that abstention would be
improper if the statute were facially invalid. Id. at 615-17. Relying upon Douglas,
the lower court had originally declined to declare a state anti-picketing statute
unconstitutional. Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846, 852 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
The Supreme Court had reversed and remanded, instructing the lower court to
reconsider in light of Dombrowski. Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965).
Cameron unlike Dombrowski, involved a pending prosecution. 390 U.S. at 613.
Compare The Federal Courts' Retreat, supra note 8, at 883 with Maraist, supra note
10, at 570-71. See Carey, Federal Court Intervention in State Criminal Prosecutions,
56 MAss. L.Q. 11, 13 (1971) ; Note, Implication of the Younger Cases for the Availability of Federal Equitable Relief When No State Prosecution Is Pending, 72 COLUM.
L. REv. 874, 882 (1972).
30. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
31. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971) (per curiam) ; Dyson v. Stein,
401 U.S. 200 (1971) (per curiam) ; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) ; Boyle v.
Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971) ; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
32. 401 U.S. at 50. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, stated:
[W]e hold that the Dombrowski decision should not be regarded as having
upset the settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the availability
of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions.
Published
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
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in a pending state criminal proceeding unless there is made a clear showing
of bad faith harassment.33 However, the Court did not carefully delineate
the scope of its policy against federal intervention.3 4 Although it was clear
from prior cases that injunctive relief was not available to halt threatened
state prosecutions absent irreparable injury, 35 the Court explicitly left open
the question of whether declaratory relief would be allowed in such a
situation. 6 As a result, a number of federal courts, including the Fifth
Circuit, interpreted Younger to preclude intervention in fact situations
37
similar to that presented by Steffel.
Deriving its bases from this historical context, the Steffel Court confronted some of the questions left unanswered by the Younger decisions.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,3 8 first faced3 9 the issue of whether
an "actual controversy" existed. 40 Distinguishing the facts of Younger,
where three of the appellees had not even alleged threats of prosecution, 4
33. Id. at 49-53. In Younger, one appellee was indicted and prosecuted for a
violation of the state syndicalism statute. Three other appellees intervened, asserting
that the prosecution of their companions would inhibit their activities as members
of the Progressive Labor Party. The Court held that the intervenors' allegations
were not sufficient to require a federal court to intervene by enjoining the pending
state prosecution. Id. at 41-42.
34. Mr. Justice Brennan, in one of the cases, Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82
(1971), clearly outlined the distinctive characteristics of the declaratory judgment
and contrasted its application with that of injunctive relief. Id. at 101-30 (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Yet, the Court seemed to draw no distinction between
declaratory and injunctive relief when no prosecution was pending. See The Supreme
Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 40, 305 (1971).
35. See notes 21-25 and accompanying text supra.
36. 401 U.S. at 41 ; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1971).
37. One district court, relying upon language in Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971), one of the companion cases to Younger. stated, "Where injunctive relief
would be impermissible, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied." Lewis v.
Kugler, 324 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (D.N.J.) (semble), vacated and remanded, 446 F.2d
1343 (3d Cir. 1971). See cases cited in Federal Relief, supra note 8, app. A at 988.
Commentators also interpreted Younger in this manner. See Shevin, Federal Intrusion
in State Court Proceedings, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 3, 8; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term,
supra note 34, at 305.
What was found to be additionally confusing in Justice Black's opinion in
Younger was the fact that he had relied upon Dombrowski, where prosecution had
been only threatened, not pending. 401 U.S. 37, 47-56 (1971). See Carey, supra
note 29, at 15; Comment, Federal Jurisdiction: Federal Injunction and Declaratory
Relief fron State Statutes Regulating Expression - Younger v. Harris and Samuels
v. Mackell, 20 J. PuB. L. 581, 590, 595 (1971).
38. Concurring opinions were filed by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 415 U.S. at 478,
Mr. Justice Stewart, Id. at 475, and Mr. Justice White, Id. at 476. Mr. Chief Justice
Burger joined in the two former opinions.
39, In its review of the prior history of the case, the Court summarily dismissed
a possible procedural problem: whether a three-judge district court should have been
convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). See note 8 supra. The Court stated
that, as petitioner abandoned his request for injunctive relief on appeal, the court
of appeals did not err in exercising jurisdiction. 415 U.S. at 457 n.7.
40. The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970),
requires the existence of an actual controversy before a federal court is permitted
to grant declaratory relief. See note 7 supra.
41. 401 U.S. at 42. See note 33 supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/10
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the Court found petitioner's alleged threats to be other than "imaginary or
speculative" 42 and noted that the prosecution of his companion demonstrated
the validity of petitioner's fear of arrest. 43 Under these circumstances, the
Court stated, one may challenge a statute that allegedly deters the exercise
44
of constitutional rights without first exposing oneself to arrest. The Court
concluded its analysis of the controversy issue by reaffirming the basic test
to be applied in considering a prayer for declaratory relief: whether there
exists "a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
'45
declaratory judgment.
Next, the Court turned to the propriety of petitioner's request for
declaratory judgment. While acknowledging the principles of comity and
federalism presented in Younger and Samuels v. Mackall,4" the Court
stressed that those cases had been limited to situations wherein prosecutions were pending. 47 The Court reaffirmed the concepts articulated in
those decisions: the principles governing abstention from injunctive relief
also dictate abstention from declaratory relief, and in all but unusual circumstances, federal courts should abstain from enjoining state criminal
prosecutions. 48 It would thus appear from the Court's reaffirmation of
Samuels and Younger that to obtain declaratory relief when state prosecutions are pending, the complainant must demonstrate irreparable injury
49
caused by a clear case-of bad faith harassment.
42. 415 U.S. at 459. quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971).
43. 415 U.S. at 459.
44. Id., citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (suit successfully
brought to obtain declaration that state anti-evolution statutes were void).
45. 415 U.S. at 460, quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312
U.S. 270, 273 (1941). As petitioner's complaints had been directed towards American
involvement in Southeast Asia, the Court expressed concern that the subsequent
reduction of involvement in that arena might have terminated the controversy. 415
U.S. at 460. The issue was left for the district court upon remand. Id.
The Court observed that the actual controversy must exist "at all stages
of review," not only at the filing of the complaint. Id. at 459 n.10, citing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) ; SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403
(1972) ; United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). The Court further
supported its position by reference to the fact situation in Golden v. Zwickler, 394
U.S. 103 (1969), where the Court refused to declare a state handbilling statute
unconstitutional since the target of appellee's literature had retired from office and
it seemed improbable that that person would become a candidate for office in the future,
id. at 109-10. 415 U.S. at 459-60.
46. 401 U.S. 66 (1971). In Samiuels, which was one of the cases in the "February
Sextext" (see note 31 and accompanying text supra), the plaintiffs were indicted
upon charges of criminal anarchy and sought alternatively injunctive relief from
prosecution or a declaration that the criminal anarchy statute was unconstitutional.
401 U.S. at 67-68. The Court affirmed the lower court's refusal to grant relief,
holding that, as the prosecution had begun, the equitable principles governing injunctive relief also applied to declaratory relief. Id. at 73.
47. 415 U.S. at 461.
48. Id. 460-62.
49. Id. at 460. See also Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 820 (1974); Samuels
73 (1971).
U.S. 66,
Publishedv.byMackell,
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However, the Court asserted that when no state prosecution is pending
the principles of federalism and comity have minimal force. 50 In such circumstances, no duplicate legal proceeding would result and there would
be no unseemly interruption of state activity. 5' Moreover, if the federal
court failed to intervene, it would place the plaintiff "between the Scylla
of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of foregoing what he
believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming
enmeshed in a criminal proceeding. '52 Hence, the Court held that when no
state prosecution is pending, the request for declaratory relief may be con5 3
sidered independent of the request for injunctive relief.
Lastly, 54 the Court dealt with the argument that declaratory relief is

inappropriate when a statute is attacked not as facially invalid, but as
applied to the petitioner.5 5 Disposing of the respondents' reliance for this
proposition upon Cameron v. Johnson,5 6 the Court distinguished that case

as one in which prosecution had been pending. 7 The Court further reasoned
that an attack upon a statute's application rather than upon its facial language, is much less disruptive of the state's administration of its criminal
system.5 8 It pointed out that a facial attack might result in a judgment
invalidating the statute completely, thus prohibiting any prosecution until
a saving construction is given. 59 When attacked as applied, the judgment
implicitly would be limited to state prosecution of the petitioner.

In its

conclusion, the Court stated that while federal interest might be less when
the statute was attacked only as applied, "The solitary individual who suffers
50. 415 U.S. at 462.
51. Id.
52. Id., citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965).
53. 415 U.S. at 462-63, 468-69. The Court noted that the court of appeals erred
by failing to distinguish between the propriety of injunctive and declaratory relief.
Id. at 463, quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. at 104. The Court additionally cited
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), as precedent for this distinction. 415 U.S. at
468-69. This is significant because it was questionable whether irreparable injury a prerequisite to an injunction preventing threatened state prosecution (see notes 21-25
and accompanying text supra) - existed in Steffel. The Court stated that that issue
was not before it, as the petitioner had abandoned his claim for injunctive relief on
appeal. 415 U.S. at 463. However, the Court did observe that there had not been
sufficient injury present in prior cases in which injunctions had not been granted
against threatened state prosecutions, thereby leaving open the question of "whether
a showing of irreparable injury might be made in a case where, although no
prosecution is pending or impending, an individual demonstrates that he will be
required to forego constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid arrest." Id.
at n.12 (emphasis supplied by court) (citations omitted).
54. Following the issue of the propriety of the request for declaratory judgment
the Court engaged in a lengthy discussion, inapposite here, of the history of federalism
and the role of injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 463-71.
55. Id. at 473.
56. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
57. 415 U.S. at 473-74. See note 29 supra.
58. 415 U.S. at 474.
59. Id., citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972); United States v.
Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/10
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a deprivation of his constitutional rights is no less deserving of redress
than one who suffers together with others." 60
The key question left unresolved in Steffel was the degree of imminence
of prosecution that must be asserted by a federal plaintiff to satisfy the
actual controversy requirement.' In characterizing the threats of arrest
to the petitioner as neither "imaginary [nor] speculative, '62 and petitioner's
concern with prosecution as not "chimerical," 63 the Court articulated a
negative standard for finding threatened prosecution which was not clarified
by the cases upon which it relied: The appellees in Younger had not been
threatened with prosecution at all; rather, they had intervened in the federal
suit, claiming that the prosecution of a companion had chilled their exercises
in first amendment expression.6 4 Further, the Court in Younger had stated
that a controversy could be said to exist if the intervenors had alleged
threatened prosecution and the district court had found this to be true by
admission of the state "or any other evidence."' 5 Finally, the other cases
relied upon by the Steffel Court suggested that while a state's assertion that
prosecution is likely is sufficient,6 6 allegations that prosecution might occur
67
sometime in the future are inadequate.
While it would thus seem that to satisfy the prerequisites of actual
controversy the plaintiff must be able to corroborate his allegation of
threatened prosecution, this issue might have been clarified by a more
affirmative standard drawn by the Court from the facts in Steffel. Although
the Court relied upon the police warnings, 68 the stipulations that arrests
would follow continued activity,6 9 and the prosecution of petitioner's companion,70 it did not say whether the presence of all of these factors was
necessary to permit a court to find the requisite actual controversy. Further,
while the Court noted its approval of petitioner's challenge to specific provisions of the state statute7 1 to support his allegation of threatened prose60. 415 U.S. at 474.
61. The Court applied the case and controversy test of Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). See text accompanying note 45
su pra.

62. 415 U.S. at 459, auotinq Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971).
63. 415 U.S. at 459, quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961).
64. 401 U.S. at 41-42. See note 33 supra.
65. 401 U.S. at 42.
66. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Court was willing to
grant a declaration that the state anti-evolution statutes were void, finding sufficient
proof of controversy in the state's assertion that it would prosecute tinder the
statute. Id. at 103.
67. In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), which involved an action seeking a
declaration that a statutory prohibition against contraceptives was invalid, the Court,
to avoid a premature constitutional decision, stated that the plaintiff must demonstrate
some immediate danger of direct injury in the form of actual, impending prosecution.
Id. at 507-09.
68. 415 U.S. at 459.
69. Id. at 456 n.4.
70. Id. at 459.
71. Id.
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cution, it is unclear whether a designation of a particular statute by which
the petitioner is threatened is necessary or merely preferable.
Although the Court did not clearly quantify the required degree of
imminency of prosecution beyond noting that "it is not necessary that
petitioner expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution .. . ,"72 it is apparent that it will require him to have been exposed to some form of very
imminent threat before it can find an actual controversy.7 3 This raises the
ancillary question of the status of the plaintiff who feels deterred, but is
not threatened. Because the Steffel Court did not separate the concepts of
standing and ripeness, 74 but chose rather to cast the case and controversy
issue in terms of a continuing actual controversy, it may have rendered this
issue conceptually more difficult for future courts. Separation of the concepts would seem to require that if real adversity of interest between the
parties confers standing, it is the fact of threatened prosecution which
ripens the cause of action.75 Consequently, a putative plaintiff could be
frustrated by the refusal of the state to ripen the cause of action. 0 The
plaintiff would not be able to seek a declaratory judgment upon the basis
of threatened prosecutions, unlike the petitioner in the instant case, but
would have to expose himself to immediate arrest. He would then be truly

72. Id.
73. Id. at 474.
74. The federal judicial power is limited by article III of the United States Constitution to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. The "case and
controversy" requirement of article III is satisfied by an allegation that the plaintiff
has suffered "injury in fact, economic or otherwise." Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-54 (1970).
For a case to be ripe for review there must be a real controversy in which
specific relief is sought, and that controversy must be capable of resolution in the
judicial process. See generally Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) ; Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
75. See Note, Declaratory Relief in the Criminal Law, 80 HARV. L. REV 1490,
1507-10 (1967).
76. The plaintiffs in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), whose case was
dismissed for lack of threatened prosecution, returned to court 4 years later as
criminal defendants. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
Although the Steffel Court discussed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), in its clarification of the distinction between
injunctive and declaratory relief (see note 53 supra), it failed to mention Doe in its
discussion of actual controversy. In the latter case, the Court found that the physicianappellants presented a justiciable controversy and did have standing despite the fact
none of them had been threatened with prosecution. 410 U.S. at 188. However, the
case might be distinguished because the Doe Court viewed the physicians as members
of a class against whom the statute was directed. 410 U.S. at 188. The Court
granted declaratory, but not injunctive, relief. Id. at 201-02.
One commentator has asserted that the requirements of a controversy are
satisfied when a party challenges governmental action which is defended by an officer
of the government. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 21.01, at 126 n.39
(1958).
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placed between the Scylla and the Charybdis of which Mr. Justice Brennan
spoke. 77 Had the Court stated the standing requirement and indicated the
degree of imminence of prosecution necessary to confer ripeness, lower
courts would arguably have a firmer basis for granting declaratory relief
prior to arrest.
The second lacuna in the opinion is the Court's failure either to distinguish the dividing line between the two stages of the threatened-pending
dichotomy, or to indicate at what stage it considered proceedings to be
pending. Initially, it must be noted that the Court's choice of the dichotomy
is significant because it was this characterization that had clarified the
considerable confusion resulting from Younger.78 However, if this approach
were to be useful, the Court should have at least indicated what it intended
by those terms. Possible guidance might be found in Perez v. Ledesma, 9
a case frequently quoted in this portion of the opinion,80 where Mr. Justice
Brennan asserted that "[o]rdinarily, [the] question may be answered
merely by examining the dates upon which the federal and state actions were
filed." 8' However, since the Steffel Court did not specifically embrace this
standard, and since state courts have found cases to be "pending" in a
spectrum of circumstances, 8 2 it would appear that no generally accepted
standard exists.
77. 415 U.S. at 462. Had the Court established that a case is ripe when prosecution is threatened, a future plaintiff would be able to avoid the paradox of being
denied access to the court for lack of ripeness only to be later denied a declaratory
judgment because the state had initiated prosecution. Unfortunately, by not addressing
this question the Court also left unresolved the status of Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241 (1967), rev'd as moot sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969). While
the Court affirmed the case for its articulation of the propriety of declaratory relief,
it did not examine an additional issue raised by Zwickler: whether declaratory relief
might be available in the absence of threatened prosecution if the petitioner is chilled
in the exercise of his first amendment rights. 389 U.S. at 252-54. Although
Zwickler can be distinguished by the fact that the attack therein was upon the facial
validity of the statute, the language of the case as a whole, as one commentator
noted, was broader than its holding. See The Federal Courts' Retreat, supra note 8,
at 858.
78. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
79. 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
80. 415 U.S. at 466-68.
81. 401 U.S. at 103.
82. See, e.g., Jones v. Wade, 479 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1973) (after indictment)
Rialto Theatre Co. v. City of Wilmington, 460 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1109 (1973)
(when arrest takes place) ; Modern Social Educ., Inc. v.
Preller, 353 F. Supp. 173 (D. Md. 1973) (application of a law officer for a search
warrant). However, one lower court thought it possible that the Court intended
to leave the question open, observing, "[I]t is highly unlikely, given the disparity
among the criminal processes of various states, that the Supreme Court meant to
enunciate a rigid rule for determining when a state criminal prosecution is in fact
pending." Independent Tape Merchant's Ass'n v. Creamer, 346 F. Supp. 456, 460-61
(M.D. Pa. 1972). See also, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 34, at 308.
Furthermore, as a number of lower courts have used the date of indictment to identify
"pending" prosecutions (see, e.g., McSurely v. Ratcliff, 282 F. Supp. 848, 853 (E.D.
Ky. 1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 412 (1968) (per curiam)), the availability of
declaratory relief may turn upon a race to the courthouse. If the prosecutor can
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Arguably, the Court might have chosen a less artificial standard for
granting declaratory relief from unconstitutional state criminal statutes.
It might have chosen, for example, to focus upon the effect of the statute
upon the individual's conduct. However, this would have meant a reaffirmation of a "chilling effect" standard, articulated in Dombrowski and
Zwickler v. Koota,s 3 and criticized in Younger. Since the Younger Court

focused upon the state's action rather than upon the individual's reaction,
it would seem that the "chilling effect" concept has been purposely abandoned. 8 4 Thus, while theoretically significant, the Steff el threatened-pending
characterization provides little concrete guidance to federal courts for distinguishing the two stages, and leaves them to make that determination upon
an ad hoc basis.8 5
The third issue which the Court left unresolved was the question of
the effect and enforcement of the declaratory judgment upon subsequent
state proceedings. With respect to this issue, Justices White and Rehnquist,
in separate concurring opinions,8 6 debated whether a federal court could
enjoin a state criminal prosecution against the federal-plaintiff-now-statedefendant.8 7 Justice Rehnquist argued that since the declaratory judgment
was a milder form of relief than an injunction, enforcement of the former
should not be by means of the latter.88 Further, he maintained that prosecution after a declaratory judgment would not be sufficient evidence of bad
obtain an indictment before the individual can lodge a complaint, the individual will
lose his chance for declaratory relief. This defeats one of the purposes of the federal
declaratory judgment: to provide a means for court determination of rights without
the risk of a state criminal proceeding. See 401 U.S. at 199 n.12.
83. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
84. This seems particularly true in light of the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Burger, which emphasized that Steffel
did not authorize declaratory relief to one who feels merely "chilled" by the existence
of a statute. 415 U.S. at 475. For a discussion criticizing the threatened-pending
distinction see Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345,
375 (1930).
85. There is considerable practical significance for the putative plaintiff as well.
If prosecution is deemed to be pending, rather than threatened, the individual would
have to attempt to vindicate his constitutional rights in the course of a state criminal
proceeding rather than being able to obtain a federal declaratory judgment. While
the former remedy may be deemed adequate, it might not be the preferable route.
86. 415 U.S. at 476-85.
87. The majority's opinion only touched upon the issue of the effect and enforcement of the declaratory judgment, when it stated:
Finally, the federal court judgment may have some res judicata effect, though
this point is not free from difficulty and the governing rules remain to be
developed with a view to the proper workings of a federal system. What is
clear, however, is that even though a declaratory judgment has 'the force and
effect of a final judgment,' 28 U.S.C. § 2201, it is a much milder form of relief
than an injunction. Though it may be persuasive, it is not ultimately coercive;
noncompliance with it may be inappropriate, but it is not contempt.
415 U.S. at 470-71, quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125-26 (1971).
88. 415 U.S. at 481-82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For support of this position,

see, Note, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute and Declaratory Judgments in
Constitutional Litigation, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1870, 1878-79 (1970).
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faith to enable a defendant to obtain an injunction under the Younger
rationale.8 9 Stressing policies of comity and federalism, Justice Rehnquist
thought that such a defendant would have sufficient opportunity in the
state court to assert the unconstitutionality of the statute, and that he could
buttress his assertion with the federal court declaration. 90 Justice White
disagreed, noting that Justice Rehnquist's views were not so much as
implied by the Steffel Court.9 1 He asserted that the declaration should be
given res judicata effect and indicated that section 2202 of the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act 92 opened a path for injunctive enforcement. 3
It is unfortunate that the Court's opinion did not address this problem.
Justice Rehnquist presented considerations which might very well inhibit a federal court from granting declaratory relief. For example, a
court might feel its declaration would not be complied with, absent an
injunction. Consequently, having before it only a request for declaratory
relief, the court might dismiss the petition. Acting sua sponte, the federal
court might even look for irreparable injury and thereby apply an abstention
doctrine inappropriate for declaratory relief. 94
Ideally, the state courts would comply with a declaratory judgment,
as this is the "norm and the desideratum." 95 However, where compliance
has not seemed likely, federal courts have indicated a reluctance to grant
further injunctive relief to enforce the declaration. 6 Further, there is
confusion even as to the res judicata effect of declaratory judgments. 97
It is submitted that since the Court imposed stringent standards for the
grant of declaratory relief, it should have armored that relief so the judg-

ment could adequately protect the petitioner by giving the declaration res
judicata effect or injunctive support.
In holding that declaratory relief could be granted even though the
statute was attacked as applied,98 the Court addressed the fourth issue of
what is the proper balance between the state interest in effective enforcement of its criminal laws and the federal interest in protecting individual
89. 415 U.S. at 483.
90. Id. at 481.
91. Id. at 477 (White, J., dissenting).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970). Section 2202 provides:
Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree

may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adversary party
whose rights have been determined by such judgment.

Id.
93. 415 U.S. at 478.
94. See Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation,
32 U. CHI.L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1964).
95. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 323 (1969). See Maraist, supra note 27, at 1337.
96. See, e.g., Independent Tape Merchant's Ass'n v. Creamer, 346 F. Supp. 456,
461 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
97. Note, The Res Judicata Effect of Declaratory Relief in the Federal Courts,
46 S. CAL. L. REV. 803, 825 (1973).
98. 415 U.S. at 473-74.
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constitutional rights. In this regard, the Court's treatment .of Cameron v.
Johnson"9 has the effect of extending the scope of federal interest beyond
the facial invalidity of a statute. It is submitted that granting declaratory
relief where it is claimed that a statute has been unconstitutionally applied
neutralizes the effect of the Court's seemingly total retreat in Younger from
the concept of the "chilling effect." 100 Here, by holding that a federal court
need not find facial unconstitutionality as a basis for intervention in order
to grant declaratory relief,, the Court implicitly reaffirmed the distinction
between injunctive and declaratory relief. The federal plaintiff seeking a
declaratory judgment appears now to be released from the strictures of
Dombrowski as interpreted by Younger.1° 1 Thus, the Court in Steffel
reopened an avenue for preprosecutorial relief by giving a clear grant to
*federalcourts to intervene.
While the balance has seemed to swing in favor of the federal courts,10 2
itremains questionable how much the individual will benefit. Much depends upon the lower federal courts' interpretation of what constitutes an
actual threat where prosecution is not pending, and how those courts interpret the effect of a declaratory judgment once given. While the Steifel
Court clearly established its support ,of the threatened-pending distinction
and the usefulness of the declaratory judgment as a means of preprosecutorial relief, it possibly attenuated its assertions by failing to clarify more
precisely the circumstances under which declaratory relief should be granted
and by what manner this relief should be enforced.
Thus, the decision in Steffel is elastic and very amenable to being
contracted or expanded. While its ultimate significance will depend upon
future interpretations, perhaps its present contribution is the reassertion
by the Court of the principle that "[t] he right to test a statute by submitting
to arrest is not a remedy."10 8
Rachel Wolkin

99. See notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text supra.
100. The Younger Court asserted that mere inhibition of the exercise of constitutional rights was insufficient to justify federal intervention. 401 U.S. at 50-52.
101. In denying petitioner's request for declaratory relief, the Fifth Circuit interpreted Dombrowski and Younger to require federal court abstention in the absence
of facial unconstitutionality or bad faith harassment, irrespective of any distinction
between declaratory judgments and injunctions. 459 F.2d at 924-25 (Tuttle, J.,
concurring).
102. Arguably, federal courts have a special interest in the protection of federal
rights. These courts have been referred to as "the primary guardians of constitutional
rights .. " Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 104 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
103. Aerated Products Co. v. Godfry, 363 App. Div. 685, 35 N.Y.S.2d 124, 126
(1942), rev'd, 290 N.Y. 92, 48 N.E.2d 275 (1943).
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